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Under the common law, property division upon divorce often
resulted in an unjust distribution of marital assets.' Modern di-
vorce legislation seeks to remedy this financial inequity by recog-
nizing the wife's financial and non-financial contributions to
the marital relationship.2 New York's Equitable Distribution
L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.03, at 4 (1983). Under the title
approach, the marriage relation itself does not alter property rights; title alone determines
asset distribution upon divorce. See id. at 4-5. This strict ownership system seemed to foster
equality, since each spouse received all that he or she earned or acquired during the mar-
riage. See Comment, Graduate Degree Rejected as Marital Property Subject to Division
Upon Divorce: In re Marriage of Graham, 11 CONN. L. REV. 62, 63 n.3 (1978). However,
because husbands generally acquired the familial property in the traditional marriage while
the wives remained at home to care for the family, the title approach "promot[ed] unequal
treatment under the guise of equality." Id. Even if the nontitled spouse contributed finan-
cially to the marriage, he or she would not share in that property. See L. GOLDEN, supra, §
1.03, at 5. This system also disregards the division of labor within the family unit, leaves the
wife with no family assets other than her husband's support obligation, and ignores the
intangibles she provides to the husband's career. See Foster & Freed, Marital Property Re-
form in New York: Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 169, 175 (1974).
In common law England, all personal property acquired by the wife before or during the
marriage became the husband's legal property. See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Com-
mon Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (1972). Further, while the wife retained title to any real property
she owned prior to marriage, the husband acquired a jure uxoris interest in this property,
therefore giving him sole possession and control during the marriage. Id. Thus, marriage
transformed the wife into a "legal cipher," or non-person. Id. at 1046. By the late eighteenth
century, the courts of equity had begun to chip away at these injustices, but these advances
were mostly achieved by those with a strong bargaining position and the wealth necessary to
retain a good legal advocate. See id. at 1057.
While social conditions in the United States differed greatly from those in England,
American colonial women carved out only limited exceptions to the prevailing English sys-
tem. See id. at 1058-59. The Married Women's Property Acts, enacted in many states dur-
ing the mid to late nineteenth century, finally extended women's marital property rights,
albeit slightly and unevenly. See Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Com-
munity Property and Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Com-
patibility with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 79-80 (1979). For a discussion of the Married Women's Property
Acts and their impact upon the marital relationship, see Johnston, supra, at 1061-70.
2 See K. GRAY. REALLOCATION OF PROPERTY UPON DIVORCE 66-67 (1977). Modern prop-
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Law,3 for example, views the marital relationship as an economic
partnership,4 and attempts to fairly and equitably allocate marital
property5 with regard to the individual circumstances of each
erty distribution legislation consists of two basic types of enactments: Community Property
legislation and equitable distribution legislation. In "community property" jurisdictions, all
property acquired by both spouses with their marital earnings is deemed community prop-
erty. See Note, Domestic Relations: Consideration of Enhanced Earning Capacity of Re-
cently Educated Spouse in Divorce Settlements, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 901, 909-10 (1983).
Each spouse thus owns a vested one-half interest in the community property, see Greene,
supra note 1, at 72, and both financial and non-financial contributions are recognized in the
distribution of the marital assets. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 1, § 1.04, at 6. Eight states
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington) have
enacted community property legislation. See Greene, supra note 1, at 71. For a listing of the
individual statutes, see id. at 73 n.7.
Approximately thirty-nine states have enacted "equitable distribution" legislation. See
Note, Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for Excluding Educa-
tional Degrees and Professional Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1327, 1327 n.2 (1983) [hereinafter Exclusion Proposal]. Generally, an equitable distribution
scheme "permits a spouse who has made a material economic contribution toward the ac-
quisition of property which is titled in the other spouse, to claim an equitable interest in
such property." Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q.
365, 379 (1984). The economic (but not necessarily financial) contributions made toward the
purchase or attainment of a marital asset are weighed against the net assets available at the
time of divorce. Id. For a listing of the individual statutes, see Loeb & McCann, Dilemma v.
Paradox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a Marriage, 66 MARQ. L.
REV. 495, 496 n.8 (1983).
Today in the United States, three states-Mississippi, South Carolina, and West Vir-
ginia-still follow the common law with regard to property distribution upon divorce. See
Freed & Foster, supra, at 379-80. In these states, because asset distribution depends solely
on title, the courts have no general or equitable power to alter the property distribution,
except as to joint property and certain minor exceptions. See id. Due to the harshness of
this common law approach, one commentator suggests that in light of recent judicial deci-
sions, South Carolina and West Virginia have retreated from the strict title approach, and
have in fact judicially adopted an equitable distribution approach. See id. at 380-81.
3 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
' See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 281, N.Y. Laws (June 19, 1980), re-
printed in [1980] N.Y. Laws 1863 (McKinney). See also Memorandum of Assemblyman
Burrows, reprinted in [1980] N.Y. LEIs. ANN. 130 ("The basic premise for the marital prop-
erty. . . reforms of this legislation. . . is that modern marriage should be viewed as a form
of partnership."); A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION DIVORCE
LAW 51 (H. Foster ed. 1981) (husband and wife should be regarded as partnership, and
"family assets produced by partnership effort and expenditure should be equitably divided
upon divorce.").
5 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986). The statute defines
"marital property" as: "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage
and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial
action, regardless of the form in which title is held. . ." Id.
The statute also defines a second type of property, "separate property," as either
(1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or
descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse;
(2) compensation for personal injuries;
MEDICAL LICENSE
case.6 Notwithstanding their progressive statutory reforms, most
jurisdictions have refused to declare a spouse's professional degree
or license a marital asset when one spouse has worked to put the
other through professional school.7 Recently, however, in O'Brien
v. O'Brien,8 the New York Court of Appeals held that a medical
license acquired during the marriage is marital property, and
therefore subject to equitable distribution under the New York
(3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property,
except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or
efforts of the other spouse;
(4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the
parties...
Id. at § 236(B)(1)(d)(1-4).
6 N.Y. Domt REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986). "Marital property shall
be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and
of the respective parties." Id. The statute then delineates nine factors to be considered in
distributing the marital property, Id. at § 236(B)(5)(d)(1-9), and provides a tenth catch-all
provision: "[A]ny other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper."
Id. at § 236(B)(5)(d)(10).
The statute also provides that "separate property shall remain such." Id. at §
236(B)(5)(b). Thus, the court's initial task is to determine which property is "separate"
under § 236(B)(1)(d)(1-4), and which is "marital" under § 236(B)(1)(c).
7 See Note, The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Other's Professional Degree Upon
Divorce, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 130, 131 (1983) [hereinafter Supporting Spouse's Rights]. One
recent decision estimated (prior to the subject case of this Comment) that twenty-two of
twenty-four jurisdictions that had considered the question of whether a degree or license
was marital property, had answered in the negative. See Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 349,
493 A.2d 1074, 1077 (1985). See, e.g., Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Ky. 1985)
(husband's medical degree relevant in setting maintenance payments, but is not marital
property); Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 362, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (1983) (Ph.D. earned by
husband not asset subject to division); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D.
1984) (future earning capacity of husband's dental degree not marital asset); Grosskopf v.
Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984) (husband's masters degree in accounting not di-
visible property). For an extensive listing of these cases, see Archer, 303 Md. at 349 n.1, 493
A.2d at 1077 n.1.
The benchmark case in this area is In re Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
The Graham court held that while Colorado's legislature intended the term "property" to
be broadly inclusive, "there are necessary limits upon what may be considered "'property.'
Id. at 430, 574 P.2d at 76. Using traditional definitions of property, the court ruled that
because an educational degree or professional license has no exchange value, cannot be as-
signed, sold or transferred, and is personal to the holder, the husband's M.B.A. degree was
not divisible upon divorce, id. at 431, 574 P.2d at 77, even though the wife had provided
70% of the couple's income, and contributed heavily to the husband's education. See id. at
432, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). Writing for the majority, Judge Lee held that
a degree or license constitutes "an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in
the future acquisition of property." Id. at 431, 574 P.2d at 77. Further, the court stated that
because a license or degree cannot be adequately valued, and a person's earning capacity is
not an item of property, a degree cannot be distributed. See id.
8 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
19861
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:539
statute.9
In O'Brien, the parties married in 1971, and moved to Mexico
in 1973 to enable the husband to attend medical school.10 The wife,
who had earned a bachelor's degree and temporary teaching certifi-
cate in New York," held various teaching and tutorial positions
while in Mexico.' 2 While both spouses contributed to the family's
financial expenses, the trial court determined that the wife had
provided 76% of the couple's income during the marriage, in addi-
tion to managing the family finances and performing household
chores.'" Upon the couple's return to New York in 1976, the wife
resumed her former teaching position, and the husband completed
his medical internship training.' 4 Mr. O'Brien filed for divorce in
December, 1980, two months after receiving his license to practice
medicine.' 5
The Supreme Court, Westchester County, held that the intent
and objectives of the Equitable Distribution Law required a fair
and flexible allocation of marital assets, and thus the husband's
medical degree and license constituted marital property. 6 A di-
vided Appellate Division reversed the trial court's distribution of
the license itself, citing recent New York precedents and persua-
sive authority, 7 a lack of legislative intent on the issue,' 8 and the
I Id. at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
,o Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
1 Id. The trial court determined that the defendant required eighteen months of post
graduate study to obtain a permanent teaching certificate, at an approximate cost of $3,000,
excluding living expenses. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 234, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1982), modified, 106 App. Div. 2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d
Dep't), modified, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
2 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745. At times, the
defendant held as many as three positions: kindergarten teacher, English teacher, and Eng-
lish tutor. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d at 234, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
13O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
,1 Id. At the time of trial, he was a resident in general surgery at a New York hospital.
Id.
15 Id.
16 See O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d at 238-39, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805. The defendant's expert
witness gave two financial evaluations; first, he determined the present value of the defend-
ant's financial contributions toward the plaintiff's medical education to be $103,390. Id. at
241, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 807. Second, he valued the medical license by considering the plain-
tiff's age, health, entry into practice, and specialty, and then capitalized the lifetime earning
differential between a college graduate and a general surgeon. Id. He thus concluded the
present value of the license to be $472,000, of which the court awarded the defendant
$188,800, or 40%. Id.
11 See O'Brien, 106 App. Div. 2d at 224-25, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 549-50. The court cited
Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep't 1982), appeal dis-
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availability and suitability of other remedies. 19 The Court of Ap-
peals reversed the Appellate Division on the issue of the license
distribution, holding that the New York Equitable Distribution
Law intended to reach beyond traditional property concepts, 20 and
that the Legislature left it to the courts to decide which specific
interests are protected beneath the marital property umbrella.2'
Writing for the court, Judge Simons stated that the statutory
language clearly indicated that an interest in a profession or pro-
fessional career potential is marital property,22 and that the legisla-
missed, 57 N.Y.2d 956 (1982), and Conner v. Conner, 97 App. Div. 2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482
(2d Dep't 1983). See O'Brien, 106 App. Div. 2d at 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
In Lesman, the court refused to declare the husband's medical degree marital property.
Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d at 158, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge
Boomer noted that the majority of other jurisdictions have held that professional licenses
and degrees are not marital assets. Id. at 155, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 937. Agreeing with the ration-
ale of In re Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), discussed supra note 7, and Maho-
ney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062, rev'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982),
the court reasoned that a degree or license "does not fall within the traditional concepts of
property." Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938. In addition, Judge Boomer
held that any attempted valuation of enhanced earning capacity is too speculative to be the
basis for a fixed property distribution. Id.
Conner followed the Lesman rationale, and further noted that "there is a real distinc-
tion between being obliged to pay maintenance or transfer marital property and being
owned in part by a former spouse." Conner, 97 App. Div. 2d at 94 n.1, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 487
n.1. Focusing on the idea of marriage as a partnership and divorce as the dissolution of that
partnership, Judge O'Connor held that neither the enhancement of one spouse's marketable
skills, nor the restitution of the spouse who sacrificed her marketable skills, is valued in the
division of the partnership assets; this enhancement and corresponding sacrifice is acknowl-
edged via support maintenance, and if appropriate, rehabilitative maintenance in prepara-
tion for a return to the labor market. See Conner, 97 App. Div. 2d at 99-102, 468 N.Y.S.2d
at 490-91.
8 O'Brien, 106 App. Div. 2d at 226-28, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550-52. "[T]here is nothing in
the Equitable Distribution Law or its legislative history that suggests an intention by the
Legislature.. .to vest a proprietary right in one spouse to the other spouse's very person."
Id. at 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
10 Id. at 231-32, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54. The court ordered a two-part maintenance
award; the first part took into account the wife's contributions to the husband's future earn-
ing capacity, considering the husband's future income growth and upgraded lifestyle. Id. at
232, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 554-55. The second part was a rehabilitative award to cover the costs of
any post-graduate studies required for the wife to attain her permanent teaching certificate.
Id.
20 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746. Judge Simons
wrote that there is no common law property interest resembling New York's statutorily cre-
ated "marital property," and thus acquisitions made during the marriage need not be evalu-
ated using traditional notions of property. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 587-88, 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. The statute provides
that in determining the equitable disposition of marital property, the court shall consider
nine factors; see discussion supra note 6. These factors include:
19861
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tive history of the enactment reinforced this interpretation.13 Ad-
dressing the issue of alternative remedies, the court concluded that
the statute did not expressly authorize the rehabilitative mainte-
nance award granted by the Appellate Division, and held that lim-
iting the defendant to such an award defeated the equitable results
that the legislature sought to achieve.2 4 Finally, in valuing the de-
gree, Judge Simons wrote that because the degree was marital
property, Mrs. O'Brien was entitled to an equitably distributed
portion of it, and not merely a reimbursement of her financial
contributions.25
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to
the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including
joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent,
wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other
party.
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any inter-
est in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of re-
taining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the
other party...
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6), (9) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). In
addition, the court noted the following provision:
e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution
is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution
of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law,
the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in
order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may
make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of
marital property.
Id. at § 236(B)(5)(e). The court held these provisions to show a clear and unambiguous
legislative intent to include an interest in a profession or professional career potential as
marital property, see O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747,
and thus granted the defendant a distributive award. Id. at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 748-49, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 717-18.
13 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584-85, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. Holding that
the legislature intended to create "an entirely new theory" of marital property distribution,
Judge Simons emphasized the economic partnership aspects of the legislation. Id. at 585,
489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. "[Flew undertakings during a marriage better qual-
ify as the type of joint effort that the statute's economic partnership theory is intended to
address than contributions toward one spouse's acquisition of a professional license." Id.
24 See id. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The limitation of a working
spouse to a maintenance award runs counter to the economic partnership concept underly-
ing the statute because it "retains the uncertain and inequitable economic ties of depen-
dence that the Legislature sought to extinguish .... " Id. Since maintenance terminates
upon remarriage, the working spouse may find her decision to remarry unduly hindered by
the possibility of never being compensated for contributions toward her ex-spouse's educa-
tion. See id.
2. Id. at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Judge Simons compared the situ-
ation at bar to one where a spouse provides the down payment for the purchase of real
1986] MEDICAL LICENSE
Although the O'Brien court has sought to bring equity to a
historically unjust area of property distribution, it is submitted
that the court erred in treating a bare license in the same fashion
as traditional forms of marital property. This Comment will dis-
cuss the statutory and policy rationale supporting the classification
of a bare license as separate property, and propose a statutorily-
permissible solution that achieves equity between the parties with-
out promoting unbridled speculation as to future career success
and earnings.
A BARE LICENSE SHOULD NOT BE MARITAL PROPERTY
New York's Equitable Distribution Law requires the court to
consider nine factors in determining the equitable distribution of
marital property,26 including direct or indirect contributions, or eq-
uitable claims made by the non-license-holding spouse to the "ca-
reer or career potential of the other party,"2 and the impossibility
or difficulty of valuing "any component asset or any interest in a
business, corporation or profession. ' 28 Stating that these words
"mean exactly what they say,'"29 the O'Brien court used these two
factors as statutory ammunition for declaring the medical license
marital property.30 It is submitted, however, that by relying on lan-
guage taken from the factors used to distribute marital property,
the O'Brien court intermingled the process of classifying marital
property with that of distributing it. An equitable distribution
trial has three stages: classification of property; valuation of prop-
erty; and distribution of property.31 An examination of the lan-
property or securities. Id. In such a case, the court would not limit the contributing spouse
to the recovery of his or her down payment; the distribution would compensate the spouse
for "any incremental value in the asset because of price appreciation." Id. Further, the ma-
jority held that while valuation problems exist, they are no more difficult than in wrongful
death actions or personal injury cases in which one's ability to work has been diminished.
See id. at 588-89, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749; see infra notes 55-59 and accom-
panying text. The court remanded the case to the appellate division for a determination of
the facts. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 590-91, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
216 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(1-9) (McKinney Supp. 1986); see discussion
supra note 6.
27 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6); see supra note 22 for the text of this
provision.
23 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(9); see supra note 22 for the text of this
provision.
29 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
30 Id.
3, L. GOLDEN, supra note 1, § 1.08, at 10.
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guage of the nine distribution factors as a whole reveals that they
are not definitional, but instead act as weights upon a balance,
thereby tipping the property distribution decision toward one
party or the other.3 2 These factors indicate a legislative intent to
reward certain spousal contributions to the marital partnership
with a favorable distribution of marital property, not a favorable
classification of it. In addition, neither the statute nor its legisla-
tive history contain any references to the classification of licenses
or degrees.33 The legislative history does manifest an intention to
create a new form of statutorily-created property, dubbed "marital
property, 3 4 but while the court refused to apply traditional prop-
erty definitions in classifying marital property,3 5 it nonetheless
32 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(1-9) (McKinney Supp. 1986), discussed
supra note 6.
33 See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 App. Div. 2d 223, 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (2d Dep't),
modified, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985) (nothing in statute nor
legislative history suggests legislative intent to "vest a proprietary right in one spouse to the
other spouse's very person."); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 160, 452 N.Y.S.2d
935, 940 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 956 (1982) ("[The legislature] has not
provided for equitable distribution of future earnings and we should not do so, either by
distorting the concept of property or by applying our own notions of equity."); DeStefano v.
DeStefano, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1984, at 14, col. 6, at 15, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County) (while
there is statutory authority to treat professional practices as marital property, no such au-
thority or legislative intent exists for degrees and licenses). But see Kutanovski v. Kutanov-
ski, N.Y.L.J., August 25, 1982, at 12, cols. 1, 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), (wording of distribu-
tion factors indicate legislative intent to include degrees and licenses) rev'd, 109 App. Div.
2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1985); Weintraub, A Commentary on O'Brien v.
O'Brien, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 3, col. 3 (Equitable Distribution Law "calls for equitable
remedies, not exact science."); Foster & Freed, Virtue Is Not the Only Reward For Spousal
Contributions, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 2, col. 4 (statute purposely gave broad definition to
"marital property," and narrow definition to "separate property").
" See Memorandum of Assemblyman Burrows, supra note 4, at 129 (statute creates
new concept of support and distribution of property). The broadly-worded statutory defini-
tion of marital property, reproduced supra note 5, "radically departs from prior New York
law based upon concepts of title," and recognizes that property accumulated by one spouse
may have been made possible by contributions and efforts of the other spouse. 11 C.J. Z'rr,
M. KAUFMAN & C. KRAUT, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 60.04(1) (1986); see supra note 20.
"' See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748; supra note
20. The Blackstonian, absolutist view of property requires two fundamental characteristics:
dominion and control. See Note, Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two The-
ories Toward Compensating Spousal Contributions, 49 BRooKLYN L. REV. 301, 309-10
(1983) [hereinafter Equitable Distribution of Degrees). A major element of dominion and
control is the power of disposition. Id. at 310. Thus, under the view espoused by In re
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), discussed supra note 7, and followed by Lesman
v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep't 1982), appeal dismissed, 57
N.Y.2d 956 (1982), and Conner v. Conner, 97 App. Div. 2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2d Dep't
1983), both discussed supra note 17, a degree or license could not be property in the tradi-
tional sense because it was inalienable and non-transferable. See Graham, 194 Colo. at 431,
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treated a non-traditional asset-Dr. O'Brien's medical license-
like a traditional asset for valuation purposes.3 6
The O'Brien holding also leaves many questions unanswered.
First, the court did not explain which licenses or degrees may be
included in the court's expansive marital property definition; the
majority gave no indication whether only professional degrees may
be distributed, or whether undergraduate degrees or technical de-
grees may also fall under the marital property umbrella. Second,
the court set no standards as to when a bare degree or license
should be marital property. The majority broadly held that the
court retains the "flexibility and discretion"3 8 to either declare the
license marital property, or merely use the license as a factor in
distributing existing marital property. 9 What the O'Brien court
termed "flexibility and discretion," however, has been called "doc-
trinal chaos" by others, who view case by case solutions to this
dilemma as inequitable and unfair.40 It is submitted that giving
574 P.2d at 77.
The more modern approach, adopted by the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY in 1936, views
property as a bundle of legal relations, including sets of rights, privileges, powers and immu-
nities. See Equitable Distribution of Degrees, supra, at 311. This broadened definition af-
forded protection to certain intangible, but valuable, interests. See id. at 313. A few courts
have either advocated or adopted this broad approach with respect to degrees and licenses.
See Conner v. Conner, 97 App. Div. 2d 88, 108, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 496 (2d Dep't 1983)
(Bracken, J. and Brown, J., concurring) (advocates broad definition of property as legal rela-
tion between a person and a thing); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio App. 458, 461, 185 N.E.2d
773, 775 (1961) (right to practice constitutes franchise, and therefore can be property). Com-
pare In re Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 470 N.E.2d 551 (1984), where the court defined
property as "a word of the very broadest import, connoting any tangible or intangible res
which might be made the subject of ownership," id. at 240, 470 N.E.2d at 559 (quoting In re
Goldstein, 97 Ill. App.3d 1023, 1026, 423 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (1981)), yet held that since a
degree or license is a mere expectancy interest, it cannot be property. Id.
A small number of jurisdictions who have treated the license or degree as a marital
asset have tended to avoid the "definition of property" issue. See Woodworth v. Wood-
worth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 263, 337 N.W.2d 332, 335 (1983); Washburn v. Washburn, 101
Wash. 2d 168, 171, 677 P.2d 152, 157 (1984).
30 See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
37 See Equitable Distribution of Degrees, supra note 35, at 323. Since the supporting
spouse actually seeks a distributed portion of the license holder's enhanced earning power,
no analytical distinction can be made between a medical license and a plumbing license, for
example. The attorney for the plaintiff at bar suggests that any kind of education that en-
hances earning capacity-even adult education courses-may soon be a "new breed" of
property. See DaSilva, O'Brien v. O'Brien Reviewed By the Doctor's Attorney, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
27, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
38 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
39 Id.
40 L. GOLDEN, supra note 1, § 6.19, at 184. One commentator writes:
A professional education or degree should not be classified as property simply
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this much flexibility and discretion to individual trial judges will
leave litigants unsure of their legal rights; thus, the legal and prac-
tical backlash arising from this decision will induce both profes-
sional and non-professional license holders to protect themselves
with pre-nuptual agreements, and for good or bad further propel
the marital institution into the realm of an arms-length commer-
cial transaction.41
because the equities of the case compel some form of relief. If it would not be
property after a long marriage .... and where the other spouse may receive main-
tenance or alimony, then it should not be property in the absense of some or all of
these factors. To sanction any other result would be to create "doctrinal chaos."
Id. See also Mullenix, The Valuation of an Educational Degree at Divorce, 16 Loy. LA-L.
REv. 227, 244-245 (1983) (case by case decisions on whether degree is marital property avoid
analytical question of whether degree actually is property); Exclusion Proposal, supra note
2, at 1349-50 (limiting distribution of degree to circumstances where no other assets exist
can only result in inequity and inconsistency).
A veritable case study in doctrinal chaos has arisen in the Kentucky courts. In Inman v.
Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (dubbed Inman I), the court held the husband's
dental degree to be marital property, but only because there was little or no marital prop-
erty to distribute, and the supporting spouse had made major contributions to the attain-
ment of the degree. Id. at 268. In Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), the
majority concluded that an Inman I-type remedy was not warranted because "an equitable
result was able to be reached without treatment of the license as marital property." Id. at
712. After remand, Inman I was appealed on other grounds to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, and was then dubbed Inman II. Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982). In
Inman II, the court stated in dicta that if the issue was to come before the court, the degree
would not be treated as marital property, but the contributing spouse would be reimbursed
with a kind of restitution-compensation. Id. at 852. Discretionary review was then granted
to Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1985), in order to resolve uncertainties arising from
Inman I, Inman II, and Leveck. Lovett held that degrees and licenses would be considered
in awarding maintenance to the supporting spouse, but could not themselves be property.
Id. at 332-33. One commentator concluded: "At its worst, [an] unpredictable pattern of re-
lief within the same jurisdiction is simply unprincipled." Mullenix, supra, at 250.
41 Cf. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (1981) ("[I]t is improper
for a court to treat a marriage as an arm's length transaction by allowing a spouse to come
into court after the fact and make legal arguments regarding unjust enrichment.. ."); Maho-
ney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 500, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (1982) ("Marriage is not a business
arrangement in which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be
settled upon divorce."); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 159, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939
(4th Dep't) (court refuses to treat marriage as purely economic undertaking, and rejects any
contractual or quasi-contractual theory of recovery), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 956
(1982). One commentator argues that the concept of "marriage as partnership" refers not to
a commercial partnership, but a conjugal one. See K. GRAY, supra note 2, at 23-4. "[Mar-
riage] is . . .that unique community of life and purpose which characterizes the ideal rela-
tion of husband and wife." Id. at 23.
A more realistic approach views the marriage, or at least the dissolution of it, in eco-
nomic terms. See Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 261, 337 N.W.2d 332, 335-
36 (1983) (while marriage is not intrinsically commercial, dissolution has resignedly eco-
nomic overtones). Some commentators feel that changes in the traditional perceptions of
marriage make contractual theories of dissolution a mere extension of the "marriage as part-
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VALUATION OR SPECULATION?
Many courts have observed that the contributing spouse in
fact has no desire to obtain a piece of the license itself; the claim-
ant actually seeks a portion of the holder's increased future earn-
ing capacity.42 This presents a conflict between the oft-stated rule
that future earnings cannot be a marital asset,43 and the O'Brien
court's holding that because the student spouse's license or degree
was made possible by contributions received during the marriage,
the enhanced future earning capacity that licensure provides is
marital property.44 Judge Simons blurred the line between present
and future assets by rejecting any distinction between an ongoing
professional practice, which has been declared marital property,
45
nership" idea. See Compensation For Financing A Spouse's Education: The Means of Eco-
nomic Justice in Maine, 35 ME. L. REV. 340, 344-45 (1983); Equitable Distribution of De-
grees, supra note 35, at 316. One commentator rather coldly views the supporting spouse as
an economically feasible source of funding for the student spouse's investment in his own
human capital. See Krauskopf, Recompense For Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Pro-
tection For the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 385 (1980). It is
suggested, however, that while the dissolution of marriage must inevitably dredge up eco-
nomic contribution and distribution issues, it is socially harmful to the marital institution to
force future spouses to contractually prepare debit-credit/investment-return analyses even
before the wedding vows are taken.
4 See In re Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 991 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91
N.J. 488, 496-497, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982); Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 153, 486
A.2d 951, 953 (1984); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984).
43 See In re Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal Rptr. 668, 678 (1979); Lesman
v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 157-58, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939-40 (4th Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 57 N.Y.2d 956 (1982); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 51, 296 N.W.2d 761, 769
(1980).
41 See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. O'Brien and
other courts have justified the distribution of enhanced future earning capacity by adhering
to a "fruits of the license" theory. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 266, 337 N.W.2d 332, 335 (1983);
Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1982, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
rev'd, 109 App. Div. 2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1985). This theory proposes that
when the advanced degree earned by one spouse is the "product of ... concerted family
investment," Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 261, 337 N.W.2d at 334, the contributing
spouse should also share in the fruits of the degree, which are the enhanced earnings the
licensed spouse will earn. Id. at 264, 337 N.W.2d at 336. In economic terms, the degree or
license constitutes "marriage specific capital" which is only valuable to the "family firm" as
long as the marriage continues. See Krauskopf, supra note 41, at 386-87. If the marriage
dissolves, however, the contributing spouse's claim to her investment in the license-holder's
earning capacity is at risk. Id. at 388. Rewarding the contributing spouse is socially impor-
tant to encourage investment in spousal education, and legally important to honor tradi-
tional expectations of return for investment. See id. at 416.
41 See, e.g., Litman v. Litman, 61 N.Y.2d 918, 919, 463 N.E.2d 34, 34, 474 N.Y.S.2d 718,
718 (1984) (law practice); Cohen v. Cohen, 104 App. Div. 2d 841, 843, 480 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361
(2d Dep't) (mem.) (share of husband's partnership interest in accounting firm), appeal dis-
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and a bare license to practice.46 It is submitted, however, that this
distinction must stand in order to preserve the crucial differentia-
tion between property acquired during the marriage, and post-di-
vorce property acquisitions or appreciation. 47
The court compared the situation at bar to one where a spouse
provides the downpayment for a real estate or stock purchase. 4
Judge Simons correctly stated that upon divorce, this spouse
would be entitled to an equitably distributed portion of the incre-
mental value of the asset, and not merely a return of the downpay-
ment.49 Application of this hypothetical in the case of a bare li-
cense or degree is not appropriate, however. A real estate or stock
purchase may increase in value solely due to random market fluc-
tuations, without any effort from either spouse ° An appreciation
in the value of separate property without any affirmative contribu-
tion by the non-titled spouse will not subject the value of that ap-
preciation to equitable distribution.5 A bare license or degree,
missed, 64 N.Y.2d 773, 475 N.E.2d 457, 485 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1984); Arvantides v. Arvantides,
97 App. Div. 2d 939, 940, 468 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (4th Dep't 1983) (mem.) (dental practice),
aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 478 N.E.2d 199, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1984).
" See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
4' See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
8 See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
49 Id.
80 Cf. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1986); supra note 6.
This section provides that upon dissolution, all separate property shall remain as such, ex-
cept that any appreciation in the value of the separate property due in part to the contribu-
tions or efforts of the other spouse, shall be marital property. See id.
" See Conner v. Conner, 97 App. Div. 2d 88, 94 n.4, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 490 n.4 (2d
Dep't 1983). Judge O'Connor set out an "active-passive management distinction," in which
he states that any appreciation in passive investments, such as securities or bank accounts,
would remain separate property since the non-titled spouse would have made no active con-
tribution to that appreciation. Id. For an appreciation in separate property to be subject to
equitable distribution, the non-titled spouse would have to make direct or indirect contribu-
tions or efforts toward the appreciation of the separate property. See Price v. Price, 113
App. Div. 2d 299, 306, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455, 461 (2d Dep't 1985). The non-titled spouse must
show a "[causual relation] to the enhancement of the separate property asset so as to war-
rant an award of a percentage of the appreciation in value of the separate property asset."
Id.
For example, in Nolan v. Nolan, 107 App. Div. 2d 190, 193, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (3d
Dep't 1985), the court held that the increase in value of the husband's securities was not
simply due to random market fluctuations, since he actively managed his portfolio full-time.
Id. The wife's contributions as mother and homemaker enabled the husband to pursue this
goal, and therefore the appreciation of the husband's securities was marital property. Id.
See also Borg v. Borg, 107 App. Div. 2d 777, 778, 491 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (2d Dep't 1985)
(wife not entitled to portion of appreciation in husband's business since she made no sub-
stantial contribution to it during couple's short six-month marriage); Rubin v. Rubin, 105
App. Div. 2d 736, 741, 481 N.Y.S.2d 172, 176 (2d Dep't 1984) (wife made no substantial
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upon attainment, is not nearly as valuable as it will become in the
future when the licensee achieves certain personal intangibles, such
as field expertise, business acumen, and professional reputation.2
Any incremental increase in the value of the license after divorce
would be without any affirmative act by the contributing spouse,
and therefore the contributing ex-spouse should not share in these
personal intangibles, which do not accrue until years after the mar-
riage dissolves.
Perhaps more disturbing than the equitable distribution of in-
tangible "assets" acquired after the divorce is the attempt to value
a bare license based on future unknowns5 3 In his concurrence,
Judge Meyer asserted that this kind of speculation is little more
than a judge's "prophecy. ' 54 While expert valuation of projected
future earnings is commonplace in our judicial system, especially
in tort cases,55 these awards are predicated upon an assumption of
wrongdoer fault, while fault is not a consideration in property dis-
contributions to husband's interest in closely-held corporation, and therefore received no
portion of appreciation).
12 Cf. Conner v. Conner, 97 App. Div. 2d 88, 98, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 489-90 (2d Dep't
1983), which compares this situation to the dissolution of an economic partnership. If one
partner sacrifices some of his own skills to advance the interests of the partnership, and as a
result another partner's marketable skills are enhanced, the contributing partner does not
"have a claim to another partner's future labors on the theory that such constitutes good
will in which all partners must share upon dissolution." Id. at 98, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 490. It is
suggested that after divorce, the supporting spouse will make no contributions to the li-
cense-holder's skill, experience, business acquaintances, clientele, or good will, all of which
accrue after the marital dissolution. While it is true that assets such as vested but unma-
tured pension rights and professional practices have been declared marital property, see
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 586, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 716-17, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746, 747-48, a
substantial portion of the financial value of those assets have accumulated during the mar-
riage. In the case of the bare license, the O'Brien court has in effect predicted that certain
attributes, qualifications and values-such as business judgment and good will-will inure
to the license-holder sometime in the future. The court then equitably distributed these
potentials as if they had already accrued.
U See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591-92, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J.,
concurring). When asked by counsel if his calculations were speculative, the defendant's
valuation expert responded:
Yes. They're speculative to the extent of, will Dr. O'Brien practice medicine? Will
Dr. O'Brien earn more or less than the average surgeon earns? Will Dr. O'Brien
live to age sixty-five? Will Dr. O'Brien have a heart attack or will he be injured in
an automobile accident? . . .I mean, there is a degree of speculation.
Id. (Meyer, J., concurring).
1, Id. (Meyer, J., concurring).
"I See Supporting Spouse's Rights, supra note 7, at 139. In both personal injury and
wrongful death actions, the remedies depend largely on expert evaluation of future earning
capacity. See Krauskopf, supra note 41, at 388-89.
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tribution situations.5 6 A large judgment based on what a license-
holder could conceivably earn may force the judgment debtor into
a career he does not wish to pursue, or perhaps prevent him from
entering a lower-paying specialization or position. 57 By fashioning
a non-adjustable award based on projected earnings, the O'Brien
solution may have the effect of forcing a bare license-holder to live
up to financial standards determined years before by a "prophetic"
court.
WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A BARE LICENSE?
The distributive award provision relied upon by the court
reads that "where the distribution of an interest in a ... profession
would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distri-
bution shall make a distributive award. . .. ,,5e This same section
further provides that "[t]he court in its discretion, also may make
a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a dis-
tribution of marital property. 59 Neither the wording of the dis-
tributive award provision nor its legislative history indicates that
the exclusive remedy left to the courts is the equivalent of an equi-
table distribution of the bare license.60 Nonetheless, the court held
" See Mullenix, supra note 40, at 270 n.183. "Except in egregious cases that shock the
conscience of the court... [fault] is not a 'just and proper' factor for consideration in the
equitable distribution of marital property." O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 589-90, 489 N.E.2d at
719, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
" See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J.,
concurring). Mr. O'Brien had in fact completed one year of an internal medicine residency,
and at the time of trial was a resident in general surgery. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring). De-
spite the plaintiff's testimony that he was dissatisfied with the surgery program and planned
on returning to internal medicine, the trial judge utilized the expert's evaluation based on a
general surgeon's future earnings. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring). While the trial judge certainly
had the discretion to discredit testimony, "equitable distribution was not intended to make
a career-decision for a licensed spouse still in training." Id. (Meyer, J., concurring). See also
DaSilva, supra note 37, at 4, col. 1, who points out that Dr. O'Brien is in fact pursuing a
career as a "primary care physician," which is a salaried position that pays considerably less
than a surgeon would earn. But see Weintraub, supra note 33, at 3, col. 2 (whether Dr.
O'Brien becomes surgeon or internist, expert's evaluation was still very conservative).
58 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
' Id. See supra note 22 for the full text of the distributive award provision.
0' See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1986). It is suggested that
the words "supplement, facilitate or effectuate" evidence legislative intent for extreme flexi-
bility in fashioning distributive awards. Cf. Conteh v. Conteh, 117 Misc. 2d 42, 43-44, 457
N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1982), which stated in dicta that the word "sup-
plement" in the distributive award provision appeared to provide a remedy where a spouse
has made financial contributions to the other spouse's education, and there was little or no
marital property. Id. "To allow a discretionary distributive award under such circumstances,
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that because the license was marital property, the defendant was
entitled to an equitably distributed portion of the license in the
form of a distributive award.6 1 Reading the above provisions to-
gether with the O'Brien court's stated equitable goals, an award
equivalent to the speculative present value of the holder's future
earnings is not mandated by statute, and the distributive award
provision in fact provides for judicial leeway in forming equitable
awards.
A more equitable remedy can be fashioned using a financial
and non-financial reimbursement approach. In Mahoney v. Maho-
ney, 2 the New Jersey Supreme Court awarded the contributing
spouse the value of "all financial contributions towards the former
spouse's education, including household expenses, educational
costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions used by
the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license. '63
While this is an appropriate starting point, it is suggested that the
contributing spouse also be reimbursed for the value of his or her
contributions and services as a spouse, parent and homemaker
during the time period the licensee attended school.6 4 In addition,
the supporting spouse should receive interest from the date of
commencement of the action.
CONCLUSION
The working-spouse/student-spouse syndrome has too long
gone unrecognized, due in part to an antiquated divorce law that
failed to heed the contributions of the non-titled spouse, and judi-
as a return of advances or contributions made by a spouse to further what were thought to
be common future goals, appears fully consistent with the [statute's] distributive award pro-
visions." Id. at 44, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 364; Weintraub, supra note 33, at p. 3, col. 2. ("[The law]
was designed with sufficient flexibility to provide equitable remedies in cases involving diffi-
cult facts.").
" See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
62 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
13 Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534.
14 Cf. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1986), which provides
statutory authority to consider these non-financial contributions in the distribution of mari-
tal property. One of the statute's strongest aims was to credit a spouse for performance of
traditional family services that often went unrecognized under prior New York law. See
Debates Relating to ch. 281 of the N.Y. Laws of 1980-Equitable Distribution Law (June 3,
1980) (statement of Ass. Sullivan). Implicit in the "partnership of co-equals" language that
frequently appears in the statute's legislative history, see supra note 4, is the notion that
non-financial contributions are as important as financial ones. See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at
585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
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cial reservations about contractualizing the marital institution.
However, in its sincere efforts to implement the equitable goals of
New York's Equitable Distribution Law, the O'Brien court has
tranformed the license-holding ex-spouse into a guaranteed invest-
ment that has been judicially ordered to "pay off."'65 Marital disso-
lution, under this statute or any other, does not mandate a fulfill-
ment of a spouse's financial expectations as if the marriage had
remained intact. Nor does the New York statute allow a court to
credit certain businesi skills and good will to a bare license-holder
who may or may not ever achieve those attributes. Even if these
predictions do become reality, they will have done so after the dis-
solution of the marriage, without any contribution from the
ex-spouse. Thus, the working spouse should be equitably com-
pensated for her contributions during the marriage, in the form
of a supplementary "financial and non-financial reimbursement
award," while the future earning capacity that licensure may pro-
vide remains separate property.
Michael R. Herman
" While the media has hailed O'Brien as a great victory for women, it is submitted that
many women may have their licenses distributed, even though their ex-husbands, who put
them through school, do not need the money. "To impose upon those women the burden of
making financial contributions to their husbands based upon their future life earnings is
manifestly unfair. . ." DaSilva, supra note 37, at 4, col. 2. These women, who leave the
marriage "seeking to improve their economic role in society," id., may instead face a large
judgment debt, thus hindering their attempts at financial independence.
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